This paper describes the structure and microeconomics of the foreign exchange market. It begins by outlining the major participants and the instruments they trade, highlighting the vast institutional changes that accompanied the emergence of electronic trading since the 1990s. It then discusses how and why order flow drives exchange rates; the economics of liquidity provision; the price discovery process; and volatility.
The foreign exchange market is far more lightly regulated than most equity or bond markets. Governments hesitate to regulate local trading practices because currency trading can take place anywhere and trading operations -which pay well and are environmentally cleancan simply move elsewhere. Despite the absence of regulation, the foreign exchange market copes remarkably well with crises. On 11 September 2001, foreign exchange markets remained open even in New York City. Mende (2006) , who analyzed how liquid currencies responded to this event, finds that standard relations among trading volume, volatility, and bid-ask spreads were sustained. The shock persisted merely a day or two.
A Two-Tier Market
The foreign exchange market is at core a two-tier market. In one, customers trade directly with their dealers; in the other, dealers trade with each other. This underlying market structure is similar to that of the U.S. Treasury and municipal bond markets but different from that of most equity markets.
The customer market is a "quote driven" or "over the counter" (OTC) market, in which most individuals or institutions needing foreign currency trade with specialized dealers. A customer first contacts a dealer to request current prices; the dealer provides two quotes, a lower price at which the dealer will buy the specified currency and a higher price at which the dealer will sell it; finally, the customer decides whether to buy, sell, or pass. Dealers normally base their quotes on those prevailing in the interdealer market. Since customer trading is not anonymous, dealers customize the bid-ask spread for each customer. Prices for a given currency pair are always expressed as units of the numerator currency per unit of the base currency, where the base currency is determined by market convention.
The rest of this section focuses more narrowly on the foreign exchange market's liquidity providers and demanders.
Liquidity Providers
Dealers trade very actively among themselves. Though trades among dealers accounted for over half of all trading in the 1980s and 1990s, this fraction has declined to 39 percent.
Meanwhile, overall trading has grown so rapidly that in absolute terms interdealer spot trading grew over 50 percent between 2007 and 2010. The most recent estimate indicates that interdealer trading exceeds $500 billion per day (B.I.S., 2010).
Before electronic trading was introduced to the interdealer market, around 1990, about half of interdealer trades were handled by voice brokers, who take orders from individual banks and verbally announce them to other major banks. By the late 1990s two major electronic limit order markets, Electronic Broking Service (EBS) and Reuters, had come to dominate interdealer trading. In the major currency pairs these brokers largely eliminated voice brokers and also replaced most direct interdealer trades. Voice brokers are still important among relatively illiquid currencies and account for about 10 percent of overall interdealer trading.
Electronic trading naturally increased transparency in the interdealer market, as it became far easier for dealers to learn the market price at a given moment. Beyond that, however, electronic trading transformed the market's industrial organization. Each big bank now offers its customers a multitude of "single-bank trading platforms," with each platform tailored to a specific customer type (King et al., 2012) . The most active customers can receive streaming prices and can trade at the click of a mouse; the least active customers can pre-specify an amount to trade at the market's daily fixing price. The massive investment in trading infrastructure required to develop and support these trading platforms introduced economies of scale. This, in turn, brought a dramatic increase in market concentration among dealers. The rise in concentration has naturally been most pronounced where electronic trading is most prevalent. Between 2007 and 2010, the number of banks accounting for 75 percent of turnover fell from 12 to 9 in the UK, from 10 to 7 in the US, from 9 to 8 in Japan, and from 3 to 2 in Switzerland. In France and Canada, which are not major trading centers, the number did not change, and in Denmark, Hong Kong, and Korea it even rose a bit (B.I.S., 2010).
The foreign exchange market's increased concentration has, in turn, brought a significant change in the way dealers manage inventory. Historically, dealers managed inventory via interdealer trades, since customer trades arrived relatively infrequently while interdealer trades are fast and inexpensive. At large banks the time between customer trades at large banks has fallen dramatically, however, due to the overall expansion of currency trading and to industry consolidation. In consequence, large dealers now typically "warehouse" inventory for the brief interval of time until they can lay it off on other customers. At large banks the rise in profits from internalized customer trades has helpfully offset a decline in speculative profits from interdealer trading.
Dealers have also changed the way they quote prices. Historically, dealers did not shade usually prices based on their inventory -lowering prices when inventory was high and vice versa -due to a reluctance to give other dealers information about their position. Now that dealers rely more heavily on customer trades for inventory management, those concerns have diminished and price shading has reportedly become standard practice.
The behavior of small dealers has changed, as well. Since the technology infrastructure required for strong customer relationships is expensive to develop and maintain, many smaller dealers now simply license this technology from larger dealers, a practice known as "white labeling." Some small banks outside of the major trading centers have even begun to withdraw from trading the most liquid currencies, where competition is most intense, focusing instead on trading their own local currency as a service to customers. Small banks traditionally relied almost entirely on profits from customer service, rather than speculative interdealer trading, to fund their trading operations; fortunately, electronic trade processing has allowed any decline in customer service revenues to be matched by declining costs.
Beyond the major dealing banks there are three other providers of foreign exchange ` 7 liquidity: global custodian banks, retail aggregators, and high-frequency traders. Global custody banks provide safekeeping, recording, and transaction services for institutional asset managers, primarily mutual funds, pension funds, endowments, and other funds with low leverage. In 2007 such institutions had custody of about $100 trillion assets (Institutional Investor, 2007) . Retail aggregators are internet based platforms that enable small individual investors to participate in the foreign exchange market.
Neither retail aggregators nor high-frequency traders existed prior to about 2000. The former take their customers' trades, which are generally under $100,000, and aggregate them into the $1-million or larger trades favored by large banks. This allows the aggregator to pass on to their customers the small bid-ask spreads of the interdealer market. Some aggregators act as dealers, trading on a principal basis with customers; others act as brokers, trading on an agency basis; some act in both ways. Though retail aggregators commonly allow customers to leverage up to 200 percent, they tightly control their risk by imposing margin requirements and liquidating positions instantaneously when margin calls are not met. The U.S. recently imposed a maximum retail leverage limits of 50 percent. High frequency traders exploit price discrepancies across electronic trading platforms by trading literally at lightning speed. Competition from these very low cost liquidity providers has been a major factor encouraging banks to internalize customer trades.
Liquidity Demanders
Liquidity demanders in the forex market include corporations, retail investors, and financial Financial customers rely on foreign currencies primarily as a store of value. Corporate customers, by contrast, rely on foreign exchange primarily as a medium of exchange, since they use foreign currencies to buy and sell goods and services and it is not efficient for them to implement the costly risk protections associated with speculative trading (Osler, 2009 ).
As in most OTC markets, foreign exchange customer market historically had difficulty gaining up-to-date price information about the market. Trades between dealers and customers need not be reported, given the lack of regulation, and interdealer prices were expensive.
Market transparency increased dramatically, however, with the advent of electronic trading.
Customers can now follow the interdealer prices throughout the day at low cost. On "request for quotes" systems customers can compare quotes from multiple dealers simultaneously. Large institutional customers can even offer liquidity to the market on certain electronic trading platforms, rather than simply demanding liquidity from dealers. The improved transparency has, in turn, brought heightened competition among dealers and reduced bid-ask spreads.
Microstructure research portrays customers as the agents that bring fundamental information to the market, thus beginning the process, known as "price discovery," through which prices reflect underlying fundamentals (this process is discussed in greater depth below).
Foreign exchange customers differ in the extent to which they are informed. Dealers generally consider hedge funds to be best informed, which may be because the standard "2 and 20" compensation structure (2 percent of NAV plus 20 percent of profits) provides such strong incentives to gather market-relevant information. Real money funds tend to focus primarily on own-currency returns to underlying assets and are generally considered by dealers to be relatively uninformed about exchange rates (Taylor and Farstrup, 2006) . This lack of focus on foreign exchange may help explain the tendency, discussed above, for real-money funds to delegate currency trading to their global custody banks.
Since the advent of retail aggregators around 2000, retail investing has exploded worldwide; it may already represent up to 10 percent of trading (King and Rime, 2010) .
Research shows that retail currency traders concentrate in the major currencies, generally trade intraday, adopt high leverage, and are generally unprofitable (Heimer and Simon, 2011) . The lack of profitability may reflect a lack of market-relevant information (Nolte and Nolte, 2009).
As in equity and bond markets, algorithmic (or "algo") trading has become ubiquitous in the more liquid currency markets. Algo trading involves computer algorithms that execute foreign exchange trades with reference to market conditions; once programmed, they trade without human intervention. Algorithms are often used to divide large trades into smaller individual transactions and space them out over time, thereby reducing execution costs. Another form of algorithmic trading, known as "high frequency trading," was discussed earlier.
ORDER FLOW AND EXCHANGE RATES
Order flow has been a major focus of currency research since it was demonstrated to be a major proximate cause of exchange rate returns (Evans and Lyons, 2002a; Hau, Killeen and Moore, 2002) . Order flow is defined as the number of trades in which the buyer was the aggressor minus the number of trades in which the seller was the aggressor. In a limit-order market, the aggressor is the agent placing a market order; in an OTC market the aggressor is the agent requesting a quote. In essence, order flow measures net liquidity demand, since the aggressor is the party demanding liquidity.
The key findings in this area rely on a simple linear regression between returns and order flow for a single currency pair C:
The coefficient on order flow is consistently positive at horizons ranging from 1 minute to a few months, implying that a currency appreciates when order flow for that currency is positive. To be more specific, the value of the euro has been estimated to appreciate by an average of 47 basis points per billion euros traded at the 10-minute horizon, 40 basis points at the 1-day horizon, and 20 basis points at the 1-month horizon. Figures The literature focuses on three hypotheses to explain the relation between interdealer order flow and returns: inventory effects, information effects, and liquidity effects.
Inventory Effects
To cover their costs, liquidity providers must quote a positive bid-ask spread, meaning they must offer to sell an asset at a price above the price at which they are willing to buy. This very bid-ask spread could thus induce prices to move in the direction of liquidity demand: buyinduced trades would tend to raise prices to the higher ask quote while sell-induced trades would reduce prices to the lower bid quote. In the absence of other influences on exchange rates, however, this effect should be only temporary, since any move up to the ask would soon be followed by a move down to the bid. However, the connection between order flow and exchange rates is substantially permanent. This permanence is suggested by the 20% explanatory power of order flow regressions at the 1-month horizon cited earlier (Berger, 2006) and by the existence of any effect at the daily horizon, given that exchange rates are wellapproximated by a random walk (Evans and Lyons, 2002a) , among other findings.
Information effects
A permanent effect of order flow on exchange rates could reflect the response of prices to market-relevant information . Suppose, for example, that a speculator expects a soon-to-be released trade balance statistic to be higher than generally expected, which would imply a stronger home currency. When the speculator buys that currency in anticipation of the news, the associated order flow would reveal to dealers that this agent believes the currency is undervalued. As dealers trade on that information it would become progressively embedded in the exchange rate itself.
The relevance of private information for returns was originally identified in theoretical work inspired by equity markets (Kyle, 1985; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) . This early research cannot be adopted wholesale to interpret currency markets, however, since the nature and sources of private information vary across markets. An equity analyst can gain private information by visiting a firm or by comparing the firm's product closely with that of competitors.
There is no analogous approach to learning about a currency, other than perhaps eliciting secrets about intervention from central bankers. Indeed, most of the macroeconomic information relevant to fundamental currency values, such as export and import figures, are publicly available. Private information about currencies exists, nonetheless, in part because macroeconomic data are always released with a lag. Foreign exchange customers might hold dispersed information about some yet-to-be-announced macro aggregate.
Suppose a corporation purchases more imported inputs because the country is in an economic upswing so demand is strong for its products. A currency dealer observing such behavior among many firms could infer the improving economy , even though each individual corporation might be unaware of the broader economic pattern. When the dealer trades on that information, its trades will lead the information to influence exchange rates (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Holden and Subrahmanyam, 1992; . Since the trades reflect fundamental information, the exchange rate move would be lasting.
The trades of financial customers, such as asset managers, will often reflect investor risk perceptions, wealth accumulation, and other fundamental factors. Thus these trades could also unintentionally reveal dispersed macroeconomic information. Hedge funds and other members of the "active trading community" can reveal heterogeneous private information, as well, but their information tends to be actively acquired through intentional research (Harris and Raviv, 1993; Banerjee et al., 2010; Kandel and Pearson, 1995) .
There is by now substantial evidence that foreign exchange order flow does carry private information. Evans and Lyons (2005) find that daily customer order flow at Citibank has forecasting power for exchange-rate returns at horizons up to six months. Evans and Lyons (2007) show that Citibank customer order flow has substantial predictive power for future GDP, inflation and money stocks . Ramadorai (2008) shows that State Street Corporation's institutional-investor flows have predictive power, as well.
If customers are asymmetrically informed, then dealers should be asymmetrically informed as well, since each dealer has different customers. Bjønnes et al. (2011) shows that ` 13 larger banks are better informed than smaller banks. This seems logical, since larger dealers have more customers, and dealers themselves support this general idea (Goodhart, 1988; Cheung and Chinn, 2001) . Further evidence for information asymmetries across dealers is presented in Moore and Payne (2011) .
The existence of information asymmetries among customers raises the question of which customers are best informed. The evidence generally indicates that financial customers are better informed than corporate customers (Fan and Lyons, 2003; Carpenter and Wang 2003; Bjønnes et al., 2011) , and some further evidence suggests that, among financial customers, hedge funds are particularly well-informed (Osler and Vandrovych, 2007) .
In emerging markets, information asymmetries may exist between domestic and foreign customers. Gereben et al. (2006) , who examine the market between Hungarian forints and euros, find that foreign players are better informed than domestic customers. Dealers themselves represent another potential source of information; at least two studies provide evidence that foreign exchange dealers not only aggregate information gathered from customers but also represent an independent source of information (Bjønnes et al., 2011; Moore and Payne, 2011) .
Froot and Ramadorai (2005) , using a multi-year database of financial flows, find that the positive short-run correlation between financial order flow and return peaks after a few months and then declines, reaching zero at about 300 trading days. Though this suggests that the influence of financial order flow is transitory, it does not undermine the hypothesis that information is key to the link between order flow and returns. Indeed, it is predicted by an exchange rate model that incorporates much of the microstructure evidence developed to date (Osler et al., 2008) . The reason is straightforward: investor purchases must inevitably be liquidated, so the influence of order flow associated with the opening of any investor positsion will eventually be reversed when that position is closed. This model also predicts that the longrun effect of corporate order flow should not be zero, since only one side of most normal commercial trades involves the foreign exchange market (the other involves direct payment or receipt of a home currency). Overall, the microstructure evidence predicts that financial forces drive exchange rates at short horizons while real-economy forces, such as relative prices, drive exchange rates at long horizons, a prediction that is consistent with much empirical evidence.
Microstructure evidence comes from Fan and Lyons (2003) . Macroeconomic sources, which are too numerous to list individually, consistently find that PPP primarily influences exchange rates at multi-year horizons while interest rates and financial variables more generally primarily influence exchange rates at far shorter horizons.
Liquidity Effects
Shleifer (1986) was among the first to propose that demand and supply for financial assets have finite elasticity, a phenomenon referred to in equity research as "downward-sloping demand." In support of this Shleifer showed that some uninformed trading -specifically trading upon the addition of a stock to the S&P 500 index -generates persistent abnormal equity returns. The relevance of finite demand or supply elasticity is referred to in currency research as a "liquidity effect." The liquidity in question, however, is not the instant liquidity provided by dealers, but instead what is called "overnight" liquidity. Overnight liquidity is needed in the foreign exchange market because individual dealers generally finish the trading day with zero inventory. The dealing community as a whole, therefore, does not provide overnight liquidity. For one set of customers to change its net position over the day, some other set of customers must take the opposite side and hold it at least until the next trading day.
There are two groups whose currency demand or supply could be expected to have finite elasticity. The first is risk-averse investors, who should -in theory, at least -increase demand for any risky asset when its price falls and raises the risk premium (Evans and Lyons, 2002a) . There is as yet no evidence that this source of overnight liquidity is influential in currency markets. The absence of evidence could simply reflect the paucity of disaggregated data on financial-customer transactions since some financial agents -most notably technical ` 15 traders -should be insensitive to risk premiums. The other group whose currency demand should have finite elasticity is commercial customers, since a depreciated foreign currency means cheaper imported inputs (higher demand) or a lower realized value from exports priced in foreign currency (lower supply). Commercial customers who do not actively monitor the market intraday can respond sensitively to returns by relying on take-profit orders, which instruct a dealer to buy (sell) a certain amount of a currency when its value falls (rises) to a pre-specified level (Osler, 2003) .
The microstructure evidence supports the importance of this second group, commercial customers, as providers of overnight liquidity. One study shows that commercial customer order flow, but not financial order flow, responds to lagged daily returns (Marsh and O'Rourcke, 2005) . 
BID-ASK SPREADS
The provision of instantaneous liquidity is one of the primary purposes of any financial market. A perfectly liquid market is defined as one in which trades can be executed immediately and at zero cost (O'Hara, 1995) . While conceptually this seems clear, in practice liquidity is often hard to measure. For small trades there may be little difficulty, since liquidity varies directly with quoted spreads. For large trades, however, the quoted spread may be of little relevance since most of the amount will be executed at prices beyond the quotes. In this case only a part of a large trade can be executed at the best available price; the rest is executed at progressively less attractive prices, with the resulting change in average price referred to as "slippage." Slippage will be determined by depth at the quotes and the shape of the order book. Slippage can be minimized by splitting large trades into small individual transactions and spreading these transactions out over time. This suggests that the speed which prices recover to equilibrium values after a transaction, known as "resilience," is also important for liquidity. We focus here on bid-ask spreads as a measure of liquidity, since Fleming (2003) , who compares measures of liquidity for practical purposes, concludes that the bid-ask spread is a superior for practical purposes than quote size, trade size, trading volume, and trading frequency.
Interdealer Bid-Ask Spreads
Standard theory postulates that bid-ask spreads compensate dealers for operating costs (e.g., salaries, facilities, capital); inventory carrying costs; inventory risk; and adverse-selection costs, meaning potential losses from trading with better-informed customers. In equity markets, bidask spreads sometimes provide rents associated with monopolistic or oligopolistic market power (Smidt, 1971; Christie and Schultz, 1994a, 1994b) .
Interdealer currency spreads are unlikely to be influenced by monopoly/oligopoly power since the interdealer market has historically been intensely competitive; indeed, dealers state in surveys that market power is not among the major determinants of spreads (e.g., Cheung and Theory suggests that inventory risk is driven by current inventory, price volatility, the size of any prospective trade, and the time until the next likely trade (e.g., Stoll, 1978; Rosu, 2008) .
Since interdealer trading is fast, inexpensive, and anonymous, forex dealers typically maintain inventory close to zero and inventories generally prove insignificant in empirical analysis of dealer behavior (e.g., Bjønnes and Rime, 2005; . Volatility, by contrast, is clearly influential, as it is in equity and bond markets. Daily measures of interdealer spreads move strongly with volatility (Bessembinder, 1993; Hartmann, 1999) , an effect that was dramatized by the doubling of spreads on September 11, 2001 (Mende, 2006) .
On an intraday basis there are striking contrasts between the behavior of equity and currency spreads. Equity spreads, volume, and volatility all follow what is typically described as an asymmetric U-shape across the trading day: they peak when the market opens, decline for a few hours, level off, and then rise modestly until the market closes. Interdealer foreign exchange spreads, by contrast, peak during the overnight hours when trading is lowest and hit their trough around mid-day London time when trading volume and volatility are highest (see Figure 1) . Osler et al. (2012) provide evidence that the intraday pattern of currency spreads is driven by adverse selection and time-to execution. Adverse selection appears to peak overnight, when uninformed customer groups are inactive but the dealing banks have traders available and members of the active trading community remain active through trading algorithms. More broadly, Osler et al. (2012) attribute the difference in behavior between equity and currency bidask spreads to the lack of formal trading hours in foreign exchange. Equity markets are closed for more than half of each 24-hour day, during which time private information accumulates that does not become embedded in prices. When equity markets finally open, therefore, informed agents rush to trade on the accumulated information (Holden and Subrahmanyam, 1992) and adverse selection hits its intraday peak (Madhavan et al., 1997) . Thereafter, private information arrives sequentially rather than in bulk, so adverse-selection risk, volatility, and trading volume all decline. The liquid forex markets, by contrast, never formally close so trading remains active all day and the price discovery process operates smoothly throughout. The influence of fixed trading hours comes into even clearer focus when we note that interdealer foreign exchange spreads follow an asymmetric U-shape in those few relatively illiquid forex markets with fixed trading hours, (see Menkoff et al. (2010) for the Russian Ruble market and Gau (2005) At least three factors can explain the cross-sectional variation of foreign exchange customer spreads. Fixed operating costs can explain the inverse relation between customer spreads and trade size, since a fixed cost can be easily covered by small spread a larger trade. "Strategic dealing" and "market power," can explain why commercial customers pay wider spreads than financial customers. Strategic dealers manipulate the rate of information arrival to their own advantage. In the two-tiered foreign exchange market, dealers can benefit from customer information when they trade with other dealers. It can therefore be rational for dealers to maximize trades with informed customers, which they can achieve by quoting such customers relatively narrow spreads. Consistent with this, Ramadorai (2008) finds that asset managers with the greatest skill in predicting exchange-rate returns pay the smallest spreads.
Customers with private information can be viewed as having a kind of instantaneous market power over their dealers, since dealers are anxious to learn whether they are buying or selling. This allows such customers to extract narrower spreads, and the traders at informed firms often face strong incentives to do so. Dealers have their own source of market power in their up-to-the-minute familiarity with market conditions. As discussed earlier, corporate customers generally know little market-relevant private information and the smallest commercial customers -say, a tiny spice importing firm -are often uninformed about basic market features like a normal bid-ask spread or current volatility. In some OTC markets, like the US municipal bond market, a lack of information about market conditions is associated with a lack of market transparency (Green et al., 2007) . This is no longer the case in foreign exchange, but small corporate firms could still be relatively uninformed since they cannot afford to devote resources to monitoring the foreign exchange market and timing trades. Further, they typically provide their employees no incentives to minimize forex execution costs. Rietz et al. (2009) show empirically that financial customers have greater market power than commercial customers relative to their foreign exchange dealers.
Custody Spreads
Like regular foreign exchange dealers, custody-bank dealers trade currencies on a principal basis and cover their inventory positions with other dealers. (A few of the largest custody banks also serve as market makers to the broader foreign exchange community.) The trading process for most custody-bank trades differs from that of standard OTC trades, however. Typically, a custody client does not speak directly with the custodial dealer but instead speaks with its "fund accountant," who forwards the trading instruction to the dealer. Since the dealer first covers his position in the interdealer market and then sets the price at which he trades with the customer, the dealer is not exposed to either inventory risk or adverse selection.
Notably, transparency is minimal for custodial clients, who only learn traded prices, not bid-ask spreads, and only receive that limited information a few days or weeks after the trade. 
PRICE DISCOVERY
The price discovery process most widely discussed in the literature is based on equity-market research highlighting the importance of adverse selection. To avoid ex-post regret, dealers incorporate a potential trade's information directly into the quoted price, which implies they must quote a bid-ask spread. As more and more customers trade on a given piece of information, the price moves progressively closer to its full-information value (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Holden and Subrahmanyam, 1992) .
This price discovery mechanism cannot apply directly to the foreign exchange market, since the best-informed customers pay narrower spreads while regret-free pricing implies the opposite. propose an alternative price discovery mechanism relevant to the foreign exchange market. They note that when a dealer offloads inventory after a customer trade he faces a familiar trade-off: an aggressive trade -such as a market order -provides speedy execution at the cost of the bid-ask spread, while a passive trade -such as a limit order -provides uncertain execution at an uncertain time but earns the bid-ask spread if executed.
This trade-off implies that a dealer should be more likely to make aggressive trades after trading with informed customers than after trading with uninformed customers. Aggressive trades after trades with informed customers move the price in the direction implied by the customer's information: upward (downward) after a customer purchase (sale).
In support of this proposed price discovery mechanism, Osler et al. find that the likelihood of an interbank market order is higher after trades that are relatively likely to carry information, specifically financial-customer trades and large trades. This proposed price discovery mechanism is also supported by other evidence including: Rime et al.'s (2010) finding that interdealer order flow has strong predictive power for upcoming macro statistical releases; Phylaktis and Chen's (2010) finding that the top trading banks dominate price discovery in the interdealer market; and Bjonnes et al. 's (2011) finding that dealers with the most informed customers are relatively likely to trade aggressively. This mechanism is also consistent with the stylized fact, reported above, that financial order flow and dealer order flow are positively related to contemporaneous returns while commercial order flow is not.
VOLATILITY
Evidence shows that asset-price volatility is a fairly persistent process, and exchange-rate volatility conforms to this regularity. Researchers have tended to assume that movements in volatility are driven by order flow which, in turn, is driven by the arrival of new information. If so, exchange rate volatility in a given part of the world would be a home-grown affair. Foreign exchange microstructure research has tested this "heat wave" hypothesis against the alternative "meteor shower" hypothesis that volatility in one part of the world is heavily influenced by volatility elsewhere. Engle et al. (1990) provided the first evidence, subsequently confirmed, that volatility surges come in waves that move around the planet, consistent with the "meteor shower" hypothesis. One could similarly inquire about how volatility in one exchange rate influences contemporaneous volatility in other exchange rates. Bubak et al. (2011) , who examine the euro-dollar rate and exchange rates among central European currencies, find that daily realized volatility of a given exchange rate depends significantly on the lagged realized volatility of other exchange rates as well as its own lags.
Currency microstructure research has also delved into the sources of volatility persistence. Berger et al. (2006) analyze extensive, highly detailed interdealer trading data using a simple model based on Kyle's (1985) depiction of returns as a linear function of order flow. They postulate, more specifically, that realized volatility (RV t ) is determined by the product of squared order flow (OF t 2 ) and the squared sensitivity of returns to order flow ( t ):
Here,  t is the residual. Under the traditional assumption that volatility derives from the arrival of new information, changes in order flow would dominate changes in volatility. Berger et al. (2006) find that order flow does dominate at short horizons, but that low-frequency movements in volatility are primarily driven by shifts in the price impact of order flow.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Currency market microstructure research has by now generated an extensive body of empirical findings that paint a fascinating, coherent picture of the foreign exchange market. It shows, importantly, this market differs from equity and bond markets in a number of important dimensions. These include: the existence and role of the interdealer market; the nature and sources of private information; the cross-sectional determinants of customer bid-ask spreads, the intraday behavior of interdealer bid-ask spreads; and the price discovery process. Since the foreign exchange market is changing rapidly, new questions are constantly emerging to fuel ongoing research.
The research on currency microeconomics has important implications for exchange-rate modeling. Given the central role of corporate traders in providing overnight liquidity, models with rigorous microfoundations must include such agents. Models will need to focus on flows, rather than stock investment holdings, because exchange rates only respond to currency-market flows and only about half of corporate currency payments actually move through the market. Finally, models will need to incorporate the fact that any investment is ultimately liquidated, so that most financial flows are ultimately reversed. This has the crucial implication that financial flows have only limited long-run influence on rates, leaving corporate flows to dominate in the long-run. 
Discussion Questions
1. Contrast the foreign exchange market's two-tiered structure with the one-tier structure assumed in classic microstructure papers including Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) . Consider not just the number of tiers, but also the way dealers view informed customers.
In the classic microstructure models, dealers trade with customers but not with each other. In foreign exchange, by contrast, dealers trade with customers and also with each other. In classic microstructure models, dealers take the extent of informed customer business to be exogenous, while in foreign exchange, dealers attempt to maximize such business.
2. How do the key factors driving customer and interdealer bid-ask spreads differ between the customer and interdealer markets?
In the interdealer market the key factors beyond operating costs are adverse selection, inventory risk and volatility, and the duration between trades. In the customer market, adverse selection does not influence spreads: rather than attempting to protect themselves from informed customers, dealers attempt to maximize their trades with such customers. The key drivers of customer spreads beyond operating costs therefore include strategic dealing and market negotiating power.
3. Which foreign exchange market participants are most and least likely to be informed?
Why?
Corporate customers are generally not well informed because they rely on foreign currencies primarily as a medium of exchange, so there is little incentive to gather information. Financial customers are often informed which is logical since they rely on foreign currencies as a store of value. Among financial customers, hedge funds seem to be best informed which may reflect the strong incentives to amass profits faced by hedge fund managers. Dealers also tend to be informed, with bigger dealers better informed than smaller dealers. Dealers are informed in part because they aggregate dispersed information reflected in the trades of their customers. Dealers also bring their own independent information to the market.
4. According to the text, electronic trading brought a dramatic narrowing of bid-ask spreads. How was this possible, given that the market was already intensely competitive?
Electronic trading also brought a dramatic lowering of costs through the introduction of straight through processing (STP). As human involvement disappeared from the processes of confirmation and settlement, errors decreased and costs tumbled.
Electronic trading also brought swollen trading volumes, and thus lower costs per trade, as retail, algorithmic, and high-frequency trading all exploded.
5. According to research cited in the paper, large foreign exchange dealing banks are better informed than small dealing banks, which implies that large banks tend to make money when trading against small banks. How could this be an equilibrium -wouldn't small banks rationally leave the market?
If banks relied exclusively on speculative profits from interbank trading to support their dealing operations, then it would indeed be rational for small banks to exit the market to avoid being picked off by better informed banks. Large banks have historically relied heavily on speculative profits, though this reliance has declined in recent years. Small banks never relied heavily on speculative profits to support dealing operations. Instead they rely primarily on returns from servicing customers -that is, on the bid-ask spreads associated with customer trades. 
Biographies

